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1. Introduction 
Local and regional governments around the world provide large plants with generous 
subsidies, often in the form of tax breaks. According to the New York Times, each year US local and 
State governments spend more than $80 billion on incentives targeted to individual firms1. In 
Europe, although government aid to firms is generally forbidden by EU legislation, national and 
regional governments do subsidize large plants by exploiting certain exemptions, including funds 
used to promote research and development, environmental protection and economic activities in 
lagging regions. Subsidies are frequently offered to attract new plants. For instance, Tesla Motors 
recently decided to locate an electric-car battery ‘gigafactory’ in Nevada (partly) because of a $1.25 
billion tax deal. However, once a plant is operational, subsidies to avoid its relocation (or that of 
some of its activities) are also common. In fact, the $8.7 billion tax break that Boeing was recently 
offered to produce a new jet in Seattle is the largest incentive received by an individual firm in US 
history. In Spain, the Seat and Ford plants in Barcelona and Valencia have regularly held regional 
governments to ‘ransom’ under the threat of relocating production. 
The welfare effects of subsidies targeted to individual firms are unclear (Wilson, 1999). 
Subsidies might cause inefficiencies if they shift plant locations to low productivity areas. However, 
as emphasized by Glaeser (2001) and Greenstone and Moretti (2004), subsidies can also be welfare 
enhancing. If the local labor supply curve slopes upward, inframarginal resident workers will gain 
by the presence of a large plant. In this context, subsidies can be seen as bids offered by different 
locations reflecting local welfare gains. A similar argument applies if large plants create significant 
(positive) local production externalities. Then, a subsidy will be efficient if it induces a plant to 
locate in an area in which the resulting local externality is especially large. 
In the policy arena, the desirability of subsidies targeted to individual firms is often 
evaluated on a cost per job basis. An argument often made in justification of such subsidies is that 
large plants create employment in local supplier firms. In fact, input-output models predict (large) 
net employment effects of big plant openings/closures. However, the opening of a large plant 
might also tighten the local labor market and, thus, reduce employment in the rest of the local 
economy. The objective of this paper is to estimate empirically the net employment effects of large 
manufacturing plants. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to address this empirical 
question directly. 
Specifically, we estimate the net local employment effects in Spain of the closure of 45 large 
manufacturing plants (median layoff of 264 jobs), which relocated abroad between 2001 and 2006. 
We match each municipality experiencing a closure to a small set of municipalities (four in the 
                                                          
1http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2012/12/01/us/government-incentives.html 
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baseline analysis) that are very similar in terms of their 2000 employment levels. We also find that 
treatments and the selected controls do not differ in their pre-treatment employment trends, either. 
This lends empirical support to the hypothesis that the plant relocations examined here were the 
result of international strategies adopted by parent companies and did not respond to declining, 
area-specific employment trends. We run differences-in-differences specifications in which each 
treatment is matched to its controls by including case-specific fixed effects. The results show that 
when a plant closes, for each job directly lost in the plant closure, between 0.3 and 0.6 jobs are 
actually lost in the local economy. This is explained by local incumbent plant expansions in the 
industry that suffered the plant closure. We find no employment effects in the rest of 
manufacturing industries or in the services sectors. One implication of these findings is that they 
suggest traditional input-output analyses tend to overstate the net local employment losses of large 
plant closures. In fact, for our sample of closures, the input-output framework predicts that, for 
each job directly lost in the plant closure, one additional job will be lost in the local economy. Thus, 
in our application, the input-output prediction overestimates the negative employment 
consequences by an order of three. The fact that some fired workers are reemployed in local 
incumbent firms in the industry that suffered the closure provides indirect evidence of labor market 
pooling hypothesis, which states that industry concentration arises because of scale economies in 
the labor market2. Specifically, our results suggest that the presence of same industry firms allow 
workers to change employers when firm specific shocks occur3. 
Fox and Murray (2004) and Edmiston (2004) study the employment effects of large plant 
openings in the US. Both studies conclude that such openings largely fail to create indirect jobs in 
the local economy. Here, our study seeks to complement these earlier reports by quantifying the 
effects of large plant closures. Note that the effects of openings and closures need not necessarily 
coincide if, for instance, a closure provides an opportunity for local incumbents to hire trained 
workers that have recently been laid off. Our study shows that plant closures do not, in fact, destroy 
indirect jobs and, moreover, that they actually generate jobs in local incumbent firms. As a 
consequence, the net employment effects of closures are smaller than the initial layoff itself. 
Greenstone et al. (2010) also study large plant openings in the US but focus on the impact on local 
productivity. In a unique empirical design, the authors use data on the subsidies offered to new 
plants by different local and State governments to define ‘winning’ counties (those attracting a 
plant) and ‘losing’ counties (those left as runners-up in the choice process). They find that the 
opening of a large plant increases the productivity of incumbent plants in the winning county 
                                                          
2 Ellison et al. (2010), Jofre-Monseny et al. (2011) and Faggio et al. (2015) test the relative importance of labor 
market pooling vis-à-vis other agglomeration economies’ mechanisms. 
3 Krugman (1991) formalizes this argument while Overman and Puga (2010) show that, in the UK, industries 
with more idiosyncratic volatility tend to be more geographically concentrated. 
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relative to that of plants in the losing county. In line with our study, Hooker and Knetter (2001) 
and Poppert and Herzog (2003) estimate the local employment effects of closures but focus their 
attention on US military bases as opposed to manufacturing plants. They report that net 
employment effects are very similar to the number of jobs directly destroyed by the closure. Finally, 
Moretti (2010) develops a framework to estimate empirically the local impact of creating an 
additional job in a tradable industry on employment levels in the rest of local industries4. His 
estimates indicate that additional jobs in one part of the tradable sector have a negligible impact on 
jobs in other parts of the tradable sector but a large positive effect on those in the non-tradable 
sector, especially if these newly created positions are for skilled occupations that command higher 
wages. Our results can (partly) be reconciled with those reported in Moretti (2010) as net 
employment effects in the industry directly affected by the closure are much smaller than the 
closure layoffs themselves. 
Following on from this introduction, the rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 
2 describes the data used throughout the paper with particular emphasis on individual plant 
closures. In Section 3 we explain how we select the control locations to match the areas 
experiencing a plant closure in terms of their respective pre-treatment employment levels. Section 
4 introduces the empirical specifications used and presents the results. Finally, section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Data 
Our study examines the impact of 45 large plant closures in the manufacturing sector resulting 
from international relocations. In this section we first describe the characteristics and 
circumstances of these closures. Then, we turn our attention to the employment data sources that 
constitute our outcome of interest. 
 
2.1 (International relocation) plant closures 
Information on plant closures (and their corresponding job losses) is obtained by combining 
various data sources. Thus, we draw on information from the firms’ international relocation dataset 
built by Myro and Fernández-Otheo (2008) and combine this with balance sheet data extracted 
from the Sistema de Análisis de Balances Ibéricos (SABI) and information obtained from newspapers 
and the trade unions. We restrict our attention to the 45 plant closures resulting from international 
relocations that occurred between 2001 and 2006 and which involved, at least, 100 job losses5. We 
                                                          
4 Using this same framework, Faggio and Overman (2014) estimate the local labor market effects of public 
sector employment. 
5 Greenstone et al. (2010) examine evidence from 47 large plant openings in the US. 
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exclude closures in the five largest Spanish municipalities (Madrid, Barcelona, Valencia, Seville and 
Zaragoza) as layoffs here are unlikely to represent a relevant shock to local employment. However, 
by so doing, only three closures are excluded. 
For each closure, we collected the following information: firm’s name, year of closure, 
number of workers laid off, activity (3-digit CNAE-93 classification), municipality of origin and 
the new country of destination6. Table A1, deferred to the Appendix, reports these plant-level data. 
Most of the closures in our dataset (49%) correspond to what the OECD classifies as medium-
technology industries. The number of workers laid off ranges between 105 and 1,600, with a 
median of 264. In terms of their impact on the local economy, the layoffs represent, on average, 
30 percent of local employment in the industry suffering the plant closure. In Spain, firms are 
among the smallest in OECD countries7. In fact, the average manufacturing plant employs 14 
workers and, therefore, all the closures in our sample can be considered as being big8. 
The plant closures we analyze form part of international relocation processes. As Table A1 
shows, most plants relocated to China or Eastern Europe. Using international relocation closures 
to estimate the effect of large layoffs on the local economy is helpful in terms of identification to 
the extent that these closures can be attributed directly to the parent companies’ international 
strategy rather than the effects of declining local employment. As is shown below, we find no 
evidence that the areas experiencing closures present differential employment trends prior to the 
closure. Two other factors need to be borne in mind when interpreting the effects of these plant 
closures. First, the study period was characterized by economic growth. Between 2000 and 2008, 
the Spanish economy experienced an average annual growth rate of 3.1 percent; however, in the 
manufacturing sector, growth was much less vigorous with employment rising at an annual rate of 
0.77 percent. Second, among the countries of the OECD, Spain’s employment protection 
regulations represent some of the strictest. This holds also for collective dismissals9. In Spain, plant 
closures are accompanied by a bargaining process between the firm and trade unions mediated by 
the (regional) government. Anecdotal evidence suggests that deals generally involve severance 
payments above the (already very high) statutory level, early retirement packages and attempts by 
local and regional governments to re-locate workers within the local economy. 
 
 
 
                                                          
6 CNAE-93 is the Spanish equivalent to the NACE classification. 
7 Entrepreneurship at a Glance 2012 (OECD). 
8 Spanish Social Security for the year 2000. 
9 OECD Employment Outcome 2004. 
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2.2 Employment outcomes 
The outcome we examine is local employment at the industry level. We draw primarily on Social 
Security employment counts by industry and municipality. The data covers the universe of 
employees in Spanish municipalities at the 2-digit industry level. One caveat of this dataset is that 
it does not cover self-employed workers10. We follow employment outcomes in the period 2000 to 
2008. Since we will study the impact of plant closures taking place between 2001 and 2006, this 
gives us a minimum of one pre-treatment year (2000) and two post-treatment years (2007 and 
2008). Additionally, we use employment data from the 1990 Census of Establishments, which 
enables us to measure (and control for) local (pre-treatment) employment trends. We end the 
period of analysis in 2008 for two reasons. First, in 2009 the industry classification underwent a 
major overhaul and, second, 2008 was the last year of economic growth in Spain with output 
growing at 0.9 percent11,12. 
 
3. Matching procedure 
Most of the 8,122 municipalities in Spain are quite small, which suggests the impact of a plant 
closure might extend beyond a municipality’s borders. Therefore, we construct a 10-km ring around 
each municipality in order to capture a municipality’s immediate neighbors. This ring is built by 
calculating air distances between municipality centroids and the resulting area serves as our baseline 
geographical unit. We define a treated area as one suffering a plant closure between 2001 and 2006 
and we select four appropriate controls using a matching procedure based on employment 
characteristics measured in 2000. Each treatment and its corresponding controls constitute what 
we label here as a case. Figure 1 illustrates the case of La Cellophane Española, a rubber and plastics 
plant in Burgos that closed in 2001. Panel (a) shows the geographical location of treatment and 
controls (Llinars del Vallès, Logroño, Alcalá de Henares and Silla). Panel (b) zooms in to show that the 
five areas are in fact the sum of the municipality itself (dark gray) and its neighbors lying within a 
10-km ring (light gray). 
                                                          
10 The data, in fact, exclude all workers in specific social security regimes which, in addition to the self-
employed, include agricultural workers, and civil servants. 
11 From 2009, the industry classification adopted was CNAE-2009. 
12 In 2009 there was a sharp drop in output of 3.8 percent (EUROSTAT). 
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The matching procedure applied operates in two steps13. First, for each municipality in 
Spain, we compute its total level of employment in 2000 by adding to its own employment level 
that of its neighbors. Then, we rank the 8,122 Spanish municipalities and create six categories (<5, 
5-10, 10-20, 20-50, 50-100 and >100 thousand employees). We restrict the matching procedure to 
municipalities within the same total employment category. Thus in the case illustrated in Figure 1, 
Burgos, Llinars del Vallès, Logroño, Alcalá de Henares and Silla have an employment level of between 
50 and 100 thousand jobs, if we consider number of jobs in the municipality itself (dark gray) 
together with the number of jobs in the neighboring municipalities (light gray). In the second step, 
the target is to make treated and control areas similar in terms of employment levels in 2000 in the 
specific industry affected by the closure. To do so, we compute the distance for this industry 
between the level of employment in each potential control and each treated area. This is done in 
two dimensions: first, we only consider employment at the level of the municipality and, second, 
we add to this figure the jobs in the neighboring municipalities. Then, we compute the following 
Euclidean distance √(Im)2+(Ia)2, where Im and Ia are the employment deviations in the industry 
affected by the plant closure at the municipality and area (municipality and neighbors) levels, 
respectively. Among the control municipalities whose employment level in this industry is higher 
                                                          
13 We do not use propensity score matching because our sample only contains plants that eventually closed 
due to an international relocation strategy. As such, we cannot predict where these plant closures might 
occur. An alternative matching procedure, and one that is more similar to the one used here, is the synthetic 
control algorithm, which matches pre-treatment trends in the dependent variable (see Abadie and 
Gardeazabal, 2003). However, this method is more appropriate for cases in which the treatment affects a 
large aggregate, such as a region or a country. In our case, we are able to choose our counterfactuals from a 
pool of more than 8,000 municipalities and so building a synthetic control is unnecessary.  
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than that of the treated municipality, i.e. Im >0, we select the two controls with the smallest 
Euclidean distance. We apply the same procedure to the control municipalities whose employment 
level in the affected industry is lower, i.e. Im <0. In the case illustrated in Figure 1, Llinars del Vallès 
and Silla are the two closest matches having higher levels of employment than Burgos in the rubber 
and plastics industry in 2000. Analogously, Logroño and Alcalá de Henares are the two closest matches 
with lower levels of employment in this industry. While we allow municipalities to be the controls 
for more than one treatment, we do not always find four controls for all cases. As a result, we have 
217 (as opposed to 225) case-municipality observations. 
In order to validate this matching procedure, we regress predetermined employment 
variables on a treatment indicator variable, while controlling for case fixed-effects. The results are 
reported in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Differences between treatments and controls. Pre-treatment employment 
levels in 1990 and 2000 
  Employment in the affected industry  Overall employment  
 1990 2000 1990 2000 1990 2000 
  
Municipality Area (Municipality & 
neighbors) 
Area (Municipality & 
neighbors) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Treatments 
-60.03 -70.07 -40.55 -67.43 14,704 19,541 
(308.7) (264.9) (338.4) (276.1) (20,118) (28,205) 
Case dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.799 0.795 0.877 0.881 0.682 0.684 
Observations 217 217 217 217 217 217 
Robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) 
 
 
The dependent variables in columns 2, 4 and 6 are the employment outcomes for the year 
2000 that are directly used in the matching procedure. These results validate the matching insofar 
as the treated and control areas do not present statistically significant differences for any of the 
variables used to perform the matching. In columns 1, 3 and 5 we measure the same employment 
outcomes in 1990, namely, the level of employment in the affected industry at the municipality and 
area levels, and total employment at the area level14. The results indicate that employment levels in 
1990 in treatments and controls were also similar, suggesting common pre-treatment employment 
trends. Figure 2 illustrates this point by plotting the evolution in employment in the industry 
                                                          
14 The 1990 employment outcomes are drawn from Censo de Locales del INE 1990. 
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suffering a plant closure for the treatment and control groups, where both time and employment 
levels have been normalized for the year of plant closure. 
 
 
 
4. Results 
Using this matched sample, we use differences-in-differences specifications to estimate the effects 
of big plant closures on local employment. We focus our attention primarily on the employment 
changes that occurred between 2000 and 2008. 
 
4.1. Local employment effects in the industry affected by the plant closure 
In this section we seek to estimate the impact of a plant closure on the employment in the industry 
suffering that closure. We estimate variants of the following equation: 
 ∆employment
ij
=αc+β job lossesij +Xij
' δ + uij                                                     (1) 
where ∆employment
ij
 is the job change in area i and industry j between 2000 and 2008 and, thus, uij 
denotes shocks in employment changes. The key explanatory variable is job losses, which is defined 
9
 
 
as the layoff count associated with the particular plant closure. If |β| equals 1, then each job lost 
as a result of the closure translates simply as one job lost in the local industry affected by that 
closure. We label |β|equal to unity as ‘the mechanical effect’, as this is the expected outcome if the 
closure had zero impact on the rest of the firms in the affected industry. However, if |β|> 1, then 
each job lost as a result of the closure generates additional job losses in the affected industry and 
area. A possible mechanism accounting for such an outcome is the one often used to justify 
subsidies, namely, that large plants create indirect jobs through the purchase of inputs from local 
suppliers15. Alternatively, if |β|< 1, then each job lost as a result of the closure creates jobs in the 
local industry affected by the closure. In the presence of workers that are imperfectly mobile across 
locations and industries, a significant collective dismissal would reduce labor market tightness and 
increase employment in all other local firms. In terms of control variables, case fixed-effects (αc) 
are included to account for case industry employment trends while, in some specifications, the 
1990 and 2000 (pre-treatment) employment outcomes used in the matching procedure are further 
included (Xij
' ) as controls. The baseline results are reported in the first two columns of Table 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
15 The presence of agglomeration economies would also be consistent with |β|> 1 as the productivity of 
local firms (and labor demand) would depend positively on local employment size. 
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Table 2. Impact of a plant closure on the affected industry. 
 A: 2000-2008 long differences B: 2000-2008 yearly differences 
 
Industry affected by 
plant closure  
Pooled 
industries 
Industry affected by 
plant closure  
Pooled 
industries 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Job losses 
-0.521** -0.628*** -0.556**    
(0.228) (0.231) (0.227)    
       
Job losses (-3) 
    0.001 0.029 0.070 
    (0.132) (0.117) (0.069) 
Job losses (-2) 
    -0.025 0.000 -0.017 
    (0.096) (0.096) (0.097) 
Job losses (-1) 
    -0.021 0.002 -0.036 
    (0.071) (0.068) (0.053) 
Job losses (0) 
   -0.700*** -0.687*** -0.728*** 
   (0.168) (0.178) (0.133) 
Job losses (+1) 
    0.046 0.059 0.072 
    (0.095) (0.09) (0.049) 
Job losses (+2) 
    -0.061 -0.061 -0.087 
    (0.103) (0.103) (0.118) 
Job losses (+3) 
    -0.087 -0.088 -0.039 
    (0.064) (0.065) (0.064) 
Case fixed-effects Yes Yes No No No No 
Pre-treatment 
employment 
controls 
No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Case year fixed-
effects 
No No No Yes Yes No 
Case industry fixed-
effects 
No No Yes No No No 
Case industry year 
fixed-effects 
No No No No No Yes 
Area fixed-effects No No Yes No No Yes 
R-squared 0.649 0.797 0.799 0.189 0.194 0.165 
Observations 217 217 4,991 1,720 1,720 39,792 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). The dependent 
variable in columns 1 to 3 is the change in employment between 2000 and 2008 at the 2-digit 
industry level. The dependent variable in columns 4 to 6 are 2000-2008 yearly changes. Columns 
1, 2, 4 and 5 include only the treated industry for each case while columns 3 and 6 include all 
manufacturing industries. Pre-treatment employment controls are the 2000 and 1990 levels at 
the appropriate industry level as well as in total employment. There are 23 (2-digit) industries in 
columns 3 and 6. 
 
The first column shows the estimates of a specification that only includes case fixed-effects. 
The results imply that a job lost as a result of a large plant closure reduces employment in the 
affected industry and area by -0.521, implying that the closure spurs employment growth in local 
firms operating in the same industry and area as the closing plant. In the second column, we add 
11
 
 
the pre-treatment employment levels (Xij
' ) to the case fixed-effects. Specifically, we include the 2000 
and 1990 industry and overall employment levels. As expected, the main estimate of interest, β, is 
not greatly affected by the inclusion of these pre-treatment outcomes (the point estimate is -0.628) 
as these controls are orthogonal to treatment status as shown in Table 1. In the third column of 
Table 2, we estimate a slightly different model by pooling all manufacturing industries so as to 
account for (possible) area specific trends in employment. Here, the specifications include case 
industry fixed-effects and area fixed-effects. The results yield a point estimate of -0.556, confirming 
that when a large plant closes, employment in the rest of the firms within the local area and sector 
increases rather than decreases. This finding provides indirect evidence of labor market pooling 
effects. As first put forward by Marshall (1890), industry concentration creates scale economies by 
allowing workers to move between firms when idiosyncratic shocks at the firm level occur. 
As discussed above, input-output analyses have often been used to predict the net 
employment effects of large plant openings/closures. For our sample of plant closures, a traditional 
input-output analysis predicts that for each job directly lost in the closure, another (indirect) job is 
lost in the local economy16. As such, our results seem to suggest that input-output analysis performs 
very poorly in predicting local employment responses to plant closures. Specifically, the traditional 
input-output analysis predicts a reduction in net employment that is three times greater (in absolute 
terms) than that observed.  
We check the robustness of our results to the specific matching procedure adopted in two 
ways. First, we re-run the baseline specification selecting only the two closest controls (as opposed 
to four). The results, reported in columns 1 to 3 in Table A2 (deferred to the Appendix), are largely 
unchanged, suggesting that our findings do not hinge on the exact number of controls selected. 
Second, we run a placebo exercise in which we drop the actual treatment and randomly assign it to 
any of the four controls. The results, presented in columns 4 to 6, are reassuring as none of the 
coefficients of interest are statistically significant. 
In the baseline regressions (panel A in Table 2), we focus on changes in employment in an 
eight-year time window. We do this as opposed to examining yearly changes for two reasons. First, 
(potential) anticipation effects might mean that employment falls in the year(s) prior to a plant 
closure. Second, the local response to a plant closure might take more than one year to take effect. 
To determine whether these possibilities are relevant in our application, in panel B of Table 2 we 
examine yearly employment changes between 2000 and 2008. In these regressions, we include the 
main explanatory variable (job losses) in the year the closure occurs as well as three lags and leads of 
                                                          
16 This is the average effect across the 45 closures using the 2005 Catalan Input–Output Table built by 
Statistics Catalonia (IDESCAT) 
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this variable. In terms of control variables, Panels A and B adhere to the same logic, although the 
addition of the time dimension changes the nature of the fixed-effects that can be accounted for. 
Specifically, column 4 only includes case year fixed-effects while column 5 includes both these and 
the pre-treatment employment controls, namely, the 2000 and 1990 industry and overall 
employment levels. In column 6, we pool all manufacturing industries and, in addition to the pre-
treatment employment controls, we introduce case industry year fixed-effects and area fixed-
effects. We find no statistically significant results for any of the lag and lead variables. This finding 
suggests that anticipation effects are not especially relevant in our application and that the bulk of 
the adjustment takes place within a year of plant closure. These results are largely consistent with 
Figure 2 in which we show the evolution in the level of employment in the treated and control 
groups. However, the contemporaneous closure point estimates are slightly higher (in absolute 
value) than those found using 2000-2008 differences. Specifically, the point estimates using yearly 
variation range between -0.687 and -0.728. This is consistent with a slight recovery in employment 
levels in the treated areas in the years after the plant closure. 
In section 3, when describing the matching procedure used, it was acknowledged that the 
effects of a plant closure might extend beyond the borders of a municipality. In Table 3 we explore 
in depth the geographical scope of the effects under study. To this end, we estimate variants of the 
following specification: 
 ∆employment
mj
=αc+β0 job lossesmj I0 +β10 job lossesijI10 + γI0+Xmj
' δ + umj                               (2) 
where  ∆employment
mj
 is the 2000-2008 change in the number of jobs in municipality m and industry 
j. Note that there are four types of municipality. Returning to the example illustrated in Figure 1, 
there is one treated area (Burgos) and four control areas (Llinars del Vallès, Logroño, Alcalá de Henares 
and Silla). In turn, each area comprises the municipality itself (dark gray) and the municipalities 
within a 10-km radius of it (light gray). Hence, we have treated municipalities, treated neighbors, 
untreated municipalities and untreated neighbors. I0 indicates if the municipality itself is a treatment 
or a control (dark gray municipality) while I10 takes the value of one for the remaining municipalities 
within the treated and control areas (light gray municipalities). In the regressions we interact these 
indicators with our main explanatory variable and, thus, we estimate the employment effect in the 
municipality directly affected by the closure (β
0
) and in the municipalities within a 10-km radius of 
the plant that has been closed down (β
10
). Since the number of jobs in the plant being closed down 
does not form part of the neighbors’ employment figures, no effects being recorded in neighboring 
municipalities implies β
10
= 0. The results are presented in Table 3.  
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Table 3. The geographical scope of the employment effects of a big plant closure. 
2000-2008 long differences.  
 Industry affected by plant 
closure  
Pooled 
industries  
  (1) (2) (3) 
Job losses in own municipality (β0) 
-0.800*** -0.515*** -0.634*** 
(0.14) (0.122) (0.121) 
Job losses in neighboring municipality (β10) 
0.023 -0.018 -0.010 
(0.024) (0.021) (0.021) 
Case fixed-effects Yes Yes No 
I0 indicator Yes Yes Yes 
Pre-treatment employment controls No Yes Yes 
Case industry fixed-effects No No Yes 
Area fixed-effects No No Yes 
R-squared 0.140 0.454 0.491 
Observations  2,514 2,514 57,822 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). The 
dependent variable is the change in employment between 2000 and 2008 at the 
industry and municipality level. I0 as defined in the text. Columns 1 and 2 include 
only the treated industry for each case, while column 3 includes all manufacturing 
industries in each municipality. Pre-treatment employment controls are the 2000 and 
1990 levels at the appropriate industry level as well as in total employment at the 
municipality level. There are 23 (2-digit) industries in columns 3. 
 
Here again column 1 only includes case fixed-effects and the indicator variable I0. Column 
2 additionally includes, as controls, 1990 and 2000 (pre-treatment) employment levels measured 
here at the municipality level. Finally, column 3 pools the data from all manufacturing industries. 
We find no evidence that the effects of a big plant closure extend beyond the municipality in which 
the closure has occurred. Hence, our finding that plant closures spur employment growth in local 
firms operating in the same industry and area is driven solely by the behavior of firms located in 
the same municipality as that which has suffered the plant closure17. 
 
4.2 Effects on other manufacturing industries and services 
According to input-output predictions, a plant closure has a negative impact on the employment 
in other industries. To determine whether this prediction is supported by the data, in columns 1 
and 2 of Table 4 we evaluate the effects of plant closures on employment in manufacturing 
                                                          
17 Additional evidence that interactions between firms are highly localized has been provided by Rosenthal 
and Strange (2003) and Arzaghi and Henderson (2008) for the US and by Viladecans-Marsal (2004) and 
Jofre-Monseny (2009) for the Spanish case. 
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industries (excluding for each case, the industry directly affected by the closure). Analogously, we 
test in columns 3 and 4 whether the layoffs caused by the plant closure reduce employment in the 
services sector. The results are reported in Table 4. 
Table 4. Impact of a plant closure on other industries 2000-2008  
  Other manufacturing industries Services 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Job losses 
0.111 -0.003 0.000 0.001 
(0.089) (0.008) (0.000) (0.003) 
Case industry fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pre-treatment employment 
controls 
No Yes No Yes 
R-squared 0.498 0.787 0.626 0.806 
Observations  4,774 4,774 3,255 3,255 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). The 
dependent variable is the change in employment between 2000 and 2008 at the industry and 
area level. Pre-treatment employment controls are the 2000 and 1990 levels at the 
appropriate industry level as well as in total employment. There are 23 (2-digit) industries in 
columns 1 and 2 and 15 in columns 3 and 4. 
 
 
Table 4 reports the outcomes of specifications in which the 2000-2008 employment change 
at the (2-digit) industry level is regressed on the job losses attributable directly to the closure and 
case industry fixed-effects. In columns 2 and 4 we also include pre-treatment employment controls. 
All the coefficients in Table 4 are statistically insignificant and close to zero, suggesting that plant 
closures have no effect on employment levels outside the industry directly affected by the closure. 
Since one job directly lost in the closure reduces employment in that industry by less than one job, 
it is important to keep in mind that the regressions reported in Table 4 measure the impact of net 
job reductions in the affected industry. This goes some way to reconciling our results with those 
reported by Moretti (2010), which suggest that reductions in tradable jobs reduce employment in 
the non-tradable industries. 
 
4.3 The effects of plant closures on incumbents and new entrants 
The results reported in section 4.1 indicate that for each job lost due to a plant closure only around 
0.6 jobs are lost in the affected industry. This suggests that jobs are created in the industry and area 
directly affected by the closure. In this regard, it is interesting to determine whether these jobs are 
created by incumbent or new firms. To answer this question we draw on data from the SABI (firm-
level) database. Although SABI does not cover the universe of Spanish firms, its coverage is 
extensive (around 80 percent of the firms on the Social Security register) and it does include the 
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self-employed18. We identify in the SABI database all firms reported as being active in the industry 
affected by the plant closure. This means the industry definition applied here is somewhat wider 
than that used above as a firm might be active in more than one industry. Columns 1 to 3 in Table 
5 re-estimate the baseline analysis using local employment levels built with the SABI database. We 
exclude the jobs in the plant closed down and, thus, the ‘mechanical effect’ now becomes zero. 
 
Table 5. Impact of a plant closure on the affected industry. SABI database. 2000-2008 changes. 
  Overall New firms Incumbent firms 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Job losses 
0.519** 0.511** 0.618** 0.013 0.009 0.022 0.533** 0.520** 0.595** 
(0.243) (0.239) (0.247) (0.038) (0.038) (0.05) (0.243) (0.237) (0.242) 
Case fixed-effects Yes Yes No No No No No No No 
Pre-treatment 
employment controls 
No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Case industry     
fixed-effects 
No No Yes No No No No No No 
Area fixed-effects No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes 
R-squared 0.318 0.341 0.367 0.597 0.627 0.507 0.311 0.327 0.354 
Observations  217 217 4,991 217 217 4,991 217 217 4,991 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). The dependent variable is the 
change in employment between 2000 and 2008 at the 2-digit industry level computed using the SABI database 
and excluding the plant forced to close. Columns 1, 2, 4, 5, 7 and 8 include only the treated industry for each case 
while columns 3, 6 and 9 include all manufacturing industries. Pre-treatment employment controls are the 2000 
and 1990 levels at the appropriate industry level as well as in total employment. There are 23 (2-digit) industries 
in columns 3, 6 and 9. 
  
The results indicate that for each job lost due to a plant closure, between 0.5 and 0.6 jobs are 
created in the local industry affected by the closure. These point estimates are slightly higher than 
those recorded in Table 3, which lie between 0.3 and 0.5. This result is, however, consistent with 
the broader industry definition used in the SABI database and the fact that SABI also includes the 
self-employed. Importantly, the results obtained with this alternative dataset confirm our main 
qualitative results, namely, that the net employment effects of large plant closures are not as high 
as the direct job losses associated with the closure itself. In columns 4 to 9 in Table 5 we re-run 
the analysis, breaking down the changes in levels of employment between incumbent firms 
(columns 4 to 6) and new entrants (columns 7 to 9). According to the results, the impact on jobs 
is concentrated in the incumbents, that is, in firms that existed before the plant was closed down. 
                                                          
18 SABI is a firm and not a plant database. Nevertheless, the Spanish economy is dominated by small and 
medium sized firms. In fact, only 1.1 percent of the firms in Spain in 2006 were multi-plant firms (Encuesta 
sobre Estrategias Empresariales, 2008). 
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5. Conclusions 
Local and regional governments around the world use subsidies to attract large plants. Similarly, 
large incumbent plants will often try to hold regional governments to ‘ransom’ under the threat of 
relocating production. The argument frequently made to justify such subsidies is that large plant 
closures have marked effects on employment that can extend beyond those of the collective 
dismissal itself. Indeed, the input-output framework has been used in predicting very large net 
employment losses. In this paper, we have empirically estimated the ‘real’ net local employment 
responses to large manufacturing plant closures. 
 Specifically, we have estimated the employment effects of the closure of 45 large 
manufacturing plants in Spain, which relocated to low-wage countries between 2001 and 2006. We 
match each municipality experiencing a closure to a small set of comparable municipalities in terms 
of employment level and mix in the year 2000. We find that treatments and controls do not differ 
in their 1990-2000 (pre-treatment) employment trends, thereby lending credence to the 
identification assumption underpinning our differences-in-differences estimates. Our results show 
that when a plant closes, for each job directly lost in the plant closure, only between 0.3 and 0.6 
jobs are actually lost in the local economy, with the adjustment being concentrated in local 
incumbent firms in the industry having suffered the closure. One implication of these findings is 
that they suggest traditional input-output analyses tend to overstate the net employment losses of 
large plant closures. In our application, the input-output prediction overestimates the negative 
employment consequences by an order of three. 
 A couple of considerations are worth making regarding the external validity of our findings. 
First, among the countries of the OECD, Spain’s employment protection regulations are among 
the strictest. At the same time, following a big plant closure, Spain’s regional governments often 
intervene to facilitate the re-employment of some of the dismissed workers in local firms. Hence, 
employment responses may differ in contexts with less government intervention. Second, the 
closures we analyze occurred in a period (2001-2006) in which the Spanish economy was growing. 
It could well be that the consequences of massive layoffs are far more negative in stagnant 
economies. This said, our findings suggest that, in normal times, local employment responses do 
not seem to justify the payment of large subsidies to avoid the relocation of large manufacturing 
plants. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1. Big Plant Closures Sample 
Case Firm Municipality 2-digit Industry Classification Year  Nº of Job losses Destination 
1 Jumberca S.A. Badalona 29 - Machinery and equipment 2002 201 China 
2 Proflex S.A. Calaf 24 - Chemicals and chemical products 2004 105 Czech Republic 
3 Torcidos Ibéricos S.A. Castellbell i el Vilar 17 - Textiles 2005 116 India 
4 Braun Española S.L. Esplugues de Llobregat 29 - Machinery and equipment 2006 684 China 
5 DB Apparel Spain S.A. Igualada 17 - Textiles 2003 255 Morocco 
6 Tenería Moderna S.A.L. Mollet del Vallès 19 - Leather and leather Products 2003 131  -- 
7 Hilados y Tejidos Puigneró S.A. Sant Bartomeu del Grau 17 - Textiles 2002 502  -- 
8 Galler Textiles S.A. Sant Boi de Llobregat 17 - Textiles 2003 313 Thailand 
9 ZF Sistemas de dirección Nacam S.L. Sant Boi de Llobregat 34 - Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 2006 185 Germany/France 
10 José Ribatallada S.L. Cerdanyola del Vallès  15 - Food products and beverages 2005 117  --  
11 Celestica S.L. Cerdanyola del Vallès  30 - Office machinery and computers 2004 320 Czech Republic 
12 Selecciones Americanas S.A. Sitges 18 - Wearing apparel, dressing and dyeing of fur 2005 124 China 
13 IMC Toys S.A. Terrassa 36 - Furniture and other manufacturing 2003 139 China 
14 Autotex S.A. Viladecavalls 17 - Textiles 2004 189 Czech Republic 
15 TRW Automotive España S.L. Burgos 34 - Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 2005 318 Poland/Czech Republic 
16 La Cellophane Española S.A. Burgos 25 - Rubber and plastics products 2001 310  -- 
17 Delphi Automotive Systems España S.L. Puerto Real 34 - Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 2006 1,600 Morocco 
18 Panasonic Iberia S.A. Celrà 29 - Machinery and equipment 2004 214 China 
19 Tybor S.A. Massanes 17 - Textiles 2003 149 China 
20 La Preparación Textil S.A. Ripoll 17 - Textiles 2004 145 China 
21 Promek S.L. Azuqueca de Henares 34 - Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 2004 350 Poland/Czech Republic 
22 Moulinex España, S.A. Barbastro 29 - Machinery and equipment 2003 270 China 
23 JoyCo España S.A. Alcarràs 15 - Food products and beverages 2004 213 China 
24 Lear Corporation Spain S.L. Cervera 31 - Electrical machinery and apparatus 2001 1,280 Poland 
25 Delphi Componentes S.A. Agoncillo 34 - Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 2001 578 Poland 
26 Electrolux España S.A. Fuenmayor 29 - Machinery and equipment 2005 454 Hungary 
27 Yoplait España S.L. Alcobendas 15 - Food products and beverages 2001 185 France 
28 Sanmina-SCI España S.L. Leganés 32 - Radio, television and communication equipment  2001 250 Hungary 
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29 Vitelcom Mobile Technology S.A. Málaga 32 - Radio, television and communication equipment  2004 433 Korea 
30 Calseg S.A. Artajona 19 - Leather and leather Products 2001 150 Tunisia 
31 Findus España S.L. Marcilla 15 - Food products and beverages 2001 471 Italy/UK 
32 Viscofan S.A. Pamplona 25 - Rubber and plastics products 2006 742 Brazil/Czech Republic 
33 TRW Automotive España S.A. Orkoien 34 - Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 2002 382 Poland 
34 Valeo Sistemas de Conexión Eléctrica S.L. San Cibrao das Viñas 31 - Electrical machinery and apparatus 2004 264 Poland 
35 MMN&P Acconta S.A. Segovia 34 - Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 2001 190 Morocco 
36 Levi Strauss de España S.A. Ólvega 17 - Textiles 2003 561 Poland/Hungary 
37 Delphi Packard España S.L. Ólvega 34 - Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 2001 560 Morocco/Romania 
38 GDX Automotive Ibérica S.L. Valls 25 - Rubber and plastics products 2005 153 Germany/Czech Republic 
39 Sanmina-SCI España S.L. Toledo 32 - Radio, television and communication equipment  2005 430 Thailand/China 
40 Alcatel Lucent España S.A. Toledo 32 - Radio, television and communication equipment  2002 150 Hungary 
41 Grupo Tavex S.A. Alginet 17 - Textiles 2006 300 Brazil/Mexico 
42 Bayer Cropscience S.A. Quart de Poblet 24 - Chemicals and chemical products 2006 300 Portugal 
43 Valeo España S.A. Abrera 31 - Electrical machinery and apparatus 2001 406 Morocco/Tunisia 
44 IAR Ibérica S.A. Montcada i Reixac 29 - Machinery and equipment 2004 423 Hungary 
45 Fisipe Barcelona S.A. El Prat de Llobregat 17 - Textiles 2006 270 China 
Notes: (1) Source: Authors’ own elaboration. 
(2) In cases 6,7,10 and 16 we have been unable to identify the country to which the firm relocated.  
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Table A2. Impact of a plant closure in the affected industry. 
2000-2008 employment changes. Robustness checks. 
 
Industry affected by 
plant closure  
Pooled 
industries 
Industry affected by 
plant closure  
Pooled 
industries 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Job losses 
-0.597** -0.771*** -0.645** 0.227 0.074 0.040 
(0.288) (0.276) (0.269) (0.214) (0.251) (0.232) 
Case fixed-effects Yes Yes No No No No 
Pre-treatment 
employment controls 
No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Case industry    
fixed-effects 
No No Yes No No No 
Area fixed-effects No No Yes No No Yes 
R-squared 0.596 0.787 0.822 0.626 0.841 0.832 
Observations 131 131 3,013 172 172 3,956 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). The dependent 
variable is the change in employment between 2000 and 2008 at the 2-digit industry level. Columns 
1, 2, 4 and 5 include only the treated industry for each case while columns 3 and 6 include all 
manufacturing industries. Pre-treatment employment controls are all the outcomes examined in 
Table 1. 
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